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ABSTRACT
The use of low-cost cameras and internet-connected sensors is
sharply increasing among local law enforcement, businesses, and
average Americans. While the motives behind adopting these
devices may differ, this trend means more data about the events on
Earth is rapidly being collected and aggregated each day. Current
and future products, such as drones and self-driving cars, contain
cameras and other embedded sensors used by private individuals in
public settings. To function, these devices must passively collect
information about other individuals who have not given the express
consent that is commonly required when one is actively using an
online service, such as email or social media. Generally, courts do
not recognize a right to privacy once a person enters public spaces.
However, the impending convergence of privately-owned sensors
gathering information about the surrounding world creates a new
frontier in which to consider private liberties, community
engagement, and civic duties. This Article will analyze the legal and
technological developments surrounding: (1) existing data sources
used by local law enforcement; (2) corporate assistance with law
enforcement investigations; and (3) volunteering of personal data
to make communities safer. After weighing relative privacy
interests, this Article will explain, under current laws, the utility of
private data to make communities safer, while simultaneously
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advancing the goals of fiscal responsibility,
accountability, and community engagement.

government
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INTRODUCTION
Surveillance programs are generally pictured as large-scale and
well-funded efforts that governments or other state actors undertake
directly. But what if the government empowered individual citizens
to contribute photos or videos passively collected from products
they already own to help solve crimes in their communities?
“Neighborhood watch” programs have roots tracing back to
American colonial settlements, and have long been encouraged by
local law enforcement to supplement their crime-fighting efforts and
foster a shared sense of community.1 Residents in these programs
are encouraged to report suspicious activity in their communities,
share information with their neighbors, and promote safety.2
While neighborhood watch programs are generally considered
effective at crime prevention in their own right, 3 people cannot
constantly watch their surroundings. The Internet of Things (IoT)
has the potential to fill these gaps and jumpstart a new era of
community involvement in crime prevention. While the IoT
manifests its presence in the world through physical “sensors” the
real game-changing value comes from using internet-connected
machines to ingest sensor data and analyze it in real time to provide
actionable insights.4 Put simply, these sensors measure, evaluate,
and gather data.5 Installations and uses of this technology, which
already monitors physical things such as homes, bridges, vehicles,
and traffic, are expected to rapidly increase in the coming decade.6

1

See Neighborhood Watch, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL (Nov. 4,
2016),
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/home-and-neighborhoodsafety/neighborhood-watch.
2
Id.
3
E.g., Does Neighborhood Watch Reduce Crime?, NAT’L CRIME
PREVENTION
COUNCIL
(JULY
10,
2008),
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/neighborhood-safety/doesneighborhood-watch-reduce-crime.pdf.
4
E.g., Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things is Far Bigger Than Anyone
Realizes, WIRED (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/theinternet-of-things-bigger/.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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People are used to having their data collected when they are
direct users of a product or service, but the adoption of IoT devices
changes the data sharing dynamic. What makes many IoT devices
unique is that they capture information about the environment as a
whole rather than just individual user information,7 thus implicating
the privacy rights of non-participants. With a large amount of data
being collected at minimal cost to localities, IoT deployment
represents a prime, new investigative resource for local law
enforcement. Currently voluntary data disclosure regulation is
limited, thus communities, corporations, and local governments
must initiate discussion about how to encourage or limit the use of
private data. 8 Having these discussions now will help minimize
negative externalities in the coming public data revolution.
I. PRIVACY LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SPACES
A.Overview
There is little to no restriction on how most information gathered
by privately-owned IoT devices may be used by the device owner.9
One possible source for restriction is the Fourth Amendment, which
protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. 10
However, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has reinforced the
doctrine that collection of “visual information” does not constitute a
“search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 11 Additionally,
third parties who provide information about others to law
enforcement generally may do so without implicating that person’s
Fourth Amendment rights. 12 This specific allowance of “visual”
information is critical in the IoT era, as it represents a large portion
of the data that will be incidentally collected and stored. 13
7

See, e.g., id. (providing the example of smart city infrastructure).
Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (affirming the third-party
doctrine, meaning law enforcement may use information freely provided by a
third-party).
9
Id.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
13
See, e.g., Davide Santo, Autonomous Cars’ Pick: Camera, Radar, Lidar?,
8
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Ultimately, requesting information gathered by the public sidesteps
the few existing legal hurdles barring such a program today.
B.The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Standard
Original Fourth Amendment interpretation was based on
traditional notions of property rights. 14 However, the Supreme
Court updated this standard in 1967 to address more “modern”
privacy challenges, finding that the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is whether a person has a “constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”15 Katz broadened the
scope of the inquiry from whether law enforcement committed a
“physical trespass” to whether there was an “invasion” of a
reasonable expectation of privacy.16 Katz also led to a new two-part
test isolating the factors that establish this “reasonable expectation”:
(1) “whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy,’” and (2) “whether the
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 17 Thus, the breadth of
individual privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment are
determined by weighing both an individual’s actual conduct and
societal values.
C.Third-Party Information
While the Fourth Amendment provides individuals with some
safeguards against government information collection, information
shared with others enjoys much less protection.18 The Court later
EETIMES
(JULY
7,
2016),
https://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1330069
(explaining the large amount of data collected by autonomous vehicles, with
cameras as the “volume leader”).
14
E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (noting the “traditional
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment”).
15
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986).
17
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
18
See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. 735 at 743-744; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 433 (1976).
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built upon Katz in finding private third parties may share
information on a target subject with law enforcement for use in an
investigation: “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public…is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”19 The Miller court
reasoned under the Katz test that a bank and its customers had no
“reasonable expectation of privacy” by virtue of their relationship,
as the information had become a business record of the bank.20 This
decision is especially significant given the relationship between the
parties: the individual was a customer of a bank, and the bank later
provided law enforcement with records of his transactions. 21
Therefore, if this precedent holds with parties in a business
relationship, those not in privity of contract will have an especially
difficult burden to establish infringement on their reasonable
expectations of privacy when the information is gathered in a public
forum.
D.Self-Determination of Privacy Expectations
The rise of industrialization and the growth of metropolitan
cities created major population centers that changed the implied
social contract for living in such a community.22 Courts recognize
there is no uniform expectation of physical privacy throughout the
United States, and instead variations are to be expected based on
self-selection of living environment.23 In Vargas, the court found
people living in a “rural” environment can reasonably expect greater
levels of privacy than urban dwellers due to the low likelihood of
passersby.24 Factors such as “gravel roads,” “distant neighbors,” and
“no public sidewalks” suggest a higher expectation of privacy.25
In contrast, urban areas with major public thoroughfares are
19

Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Howard Gillman, The Constitution Beseiged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 76-86 (Duke University Press 1993).
23
See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184672 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014).
24
Id. at 20.
25
Id.
20
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more likely to be frequented by IoT devices with sensors, 26 and
surrounding residents are also less likely to have a valid privacy
expectation in property exposed to roadways. The Supreme Court
has gone so far as to say that under certain conditions there is no
right to privacy on public land.27 In Knotts, the Court held that a
person traveling in an automobile on public roads has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her movements from one place to
another. 28 Thus, locality attributes are likely to play a significant
factor in the development of public opinions and reasonable
expectations on the use of IoT data by local law enforcement.
However, physical setting is not the only factor that makes a
privacy expectation “reasonable.” While geographical attributes are
likely to remain fairly consistent over time, the Court has also
indicated that the development of new technology represents a more
elastic variable that can change reasonable societal expectations of
privacy.29 The Jones court found that “[t]he availability and use of .
. . new devices will continue to shape the average person’s
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.”30
The adoption of IoT products and services in the coming years will
likely reduce this overall “reasonable expectation” of privacy,
especially in cities. With an estimated 50 billion new sensors
connecting to the internet by 2020, 31 the adoption of new IoT
technologies encourages consideration of whether the same legal
framework and surveillance programs make sense in this new era of
technology. The use of IoT data by local law enforcement presents
a prime issue for public input based on the Court’s interpretation of
“reasonable expectations” of privacy in relation to local attributes.

26

See, e.g., Burrus, supra note 4.
E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
28
Id.
29
E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012).
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., CEO to shareholders: 50 billion connections 2020, ERICSSON,
(Apr. 2010), https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2010/4/ceo-toshareholders-50-billion-connections-2020.
27
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II. CURRENT INFORMATION GATHERING PROGRAMS
While various forms of neighborhood watch programs have
been used for years in communities throughout the country, the
format has not significantly changed. Typically, information is
generally spread person-to-person or through neighborhood
meetings.32 Citizens report crime tips to law enforcement,33 but it is
not always clear whether the relayed information will be acted upon
or whether it is particularly useful. While this communication
method may work in some situations, IoT technology has the
potential to collect useful information and discharge their public
safety responsibilities in a cost-effective manner.
A.Local Governments
Local law enforcement agencies have already begun utilizing
cameras to collect information for investigations and to improve
public safety.34 The speed, efficiency, and increased widespread use
of such systems is causing public concern over government
collection of data. 35 Adding to the confusion, community groups
often condition their support for body cameras on implementation
of privacy and publication policies, rather than the use of the
technology itself.36 Ultimately, the propensity for legal challenges
and costs, demonstrates the benefits of moving towards
crowdsourcing of data collection.
1. Direct Data Collection by Law Enforcement

32

See, e.g., Neighborhood Watch, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Neighborhood Watch, supra note 1.
34
See, e.g., Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped
Police and Lenders Target the Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readershave-helped-police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436.
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Police Body Cameras,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/police-body-cameras (providing one example of implementationdependent support).
33
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Law enforcement agencies are increasingly looking to
technology as a means of accomplishing public safety goals while
mitigating the effects of reduced budgets and fewer officers. The
most recent technology receiving notoriety is body-worn cameras.
With increasing public scrutiny of police use of force, departments
across the country are rapidly deploying body cameras as a means
of documenting incidents through an impartial lens.37 While these
cameras seemingly represent increased government surveillance of
the public, civil liberties groups are generally in support of the
technology as long as policies are in place to maximize
accountability. 38 The relative value of having video evidence, as
long as it is properly implemented, is thought to outweigh the
associated privacy interest.39 Los Angeles is spending nearly $60
million over five years to provide over 7,000 officers with body
cameras.40 However, purchasing the camera equipment itself is only
a small fraction of the roll-out challenge. In addition to storing the
roughly 10,000 hours per week of video generated by police in large
cities, 41 employees must be assigned to review the footage and
evaluate usage.42
Since state governments have been slower to react to this new
technology,43 “police departments . . . have been left on their own”
37

E.g., Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use
Body Cameras, GOVERNING (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-body-camerasurvey.html.
38
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 36.
39
Id.
40
Kate Mather & David Zahniser, City Council vote resumes $57.6-million
rollout of LAPD body Cameras, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 22, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-body-cameras-20160622snap-story.html.
41
E.g., John Sanburn, Storing Body Cam Data is the Next Big Challenge for
Police, TIME (Jan. 25, 2016), http://time.com/4180889/police-body-camerasvievu-taser/.
42
See, e.g., For police body cameras, big costs loom in storing footage,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(Feb.
6,
2015),
http://chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/chi-body-cameras-hidden-costs20150206-story.html.
43
See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, These are the states that want to regulate police
body
camera
videos,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
25,
2016),
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and forced to “improvise” when it comes to applying existing laws
to this new data source. 44 One of the largest unintended
consequences has been the application of Public Records Acts to
body camera footage. There has already been at least one attempt to
force a department to release all footage collected, a task that was
purported to take four years to complete.45 While the cameras help
solve some immediate challenges facing communities, subjecting a
vast new database to established laws creates new problems
demanding a rapid policy response to avoid undesirable
consequences.
Though costly to implement,46 investments in body cameras are
already proving useful for many municipalities. Studies show that
use of body cameras may reduce police use of force by nearly 50%,
while citizen complaints have declined by over 90%.47 Thus, the use
of cameras appears to have a highly desirable impact on public
safety and accountability from both the standpoint of the public as
well as law enforcement.
While deployment of body cameras for police accountability
purposes is generally viewed in a positive light, the use of cameras
to improve the efficiency of policing efforts has received a sharply
contrasting response. One such implementation is license platereading technology. 48 License plate camera systems may be
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/25/these-arethe-states-that-want-to-regulate-police-body-cameravideos/?utm_term=.989d558fbcee7.
44
Kate Mather & Cindy Chang, Fresno police break ranks with other
departments by releasing shooting video from body camera, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (July 15, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-fresnopolice-body-cameras-20160714-snap-story.html.
45
E.g., Andrew Binion, Body cam legislation in the works as more requests
come in, KITSAP SUN (Nov. 22, 2014),
http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/local/body-cam-legislation-in-the-works-asmore-requests-come-in-ep-792583825-355115031.html.
46
Jason Kotowski, Money, Storage Primary Obstacles in Police Body
Camera Implementation, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (March 8, 2016),
http://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Police-Body-Cam-Installation.html.
47
E.g., Barak Ariel, Do Police Body Cameras Really Work?, IEEE
SPECTRUM (May 4, 2016), http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumerelectronics/portable-devices/do-police-body-cameras-really-work.
48
See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Even the FBI Had Privacy Concerns on License
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mounted to infrastructure or mobile vehicles, where they take photos
of license plates which are stored on a database. 49 Photographic
records can be linked and the information gleaned from these
records can reportedly be used to track the movement of
individuals.50
While relatively effective in gathering and aggregating data at
scale, the technology has not escaped the criticism of civil liberties
groups and even some law enforcement agencies. Documents
obtained by the ACLU suggest that in 2012 the FBI put its license
plate reader program on hold after concerns over its legality.51 As
many publications note, the primary privacy issue with direct data
collection by law enforcement is not the camera, but the centralized
“storing and studying [of] people’s everyday activities.”52 Thus, the
inevitable legal challenges to recently adopted technology enabling
direct data collection by law enforcement will play a key role in
determining the policing strategies of the future.
2. Challenges to Direct Data Collection by Law Enforcement
While the Supreme Court has shown mixed responses to
warrantless use of new police technology, it has remained fairly
consistent in permitting the gathering of information that can
otherwise be observed with the naked eye. 53 This interpretation
stays close to the traditional Fourth Amendment position that “mere
visual observation does not constitute a search.”54 The Court has
categorized modern investigative tools according to their
technological function and scope: (1) expanding the abilities of
officers to use the naked eye from public thoroughfares, (2)
expanding the abilities of officers to see “beyond” the naked eye
Plate Readers, WIRED (May 15, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/evenfbi-privacy-concerns-license-plate-readers/.
49
See, e.g., Waddell, supra note 34.
50
Id.
51
Zetter, supra note 48.
52
Conor Friedersdorf, An Unprecedented Threat to Privacy, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/vigilantsolutions-surveillance/427047/.
53
E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
54
Id.
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from public thoroughfares, and (3) expanding the abilities of officers
with no line of sight.
In addition to finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when
individuals are on a public street, the Court has found a similar lack
of a cognizable privacy right from human aerial observation. For
example, pre-warrant surveillance of a suspect’s backyard by an
officer looking out of an airplane at 1,000 feet was found lawful.55
The Ciraolo court held that even though the suspect may have
established a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was
neither reasonable nor one “that society is prepared to honor.” 56
Later decisions indicate altitude is not a determining factor in the
“reasonableness” evaluation. 57 The Riley court noted “in an age
where private and commercial flight in the public airways is
routine,” it was unreasonable for the defendant to expect privacy in
his backyard activities.58 Additionally, the court reemphasized that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect activity “visible to the
naked eye” from “public airways.”59 Thus, public airways appear to
extend the same minimal “eyesight” privacy protections existing on
ground-based public thoroughfares.
Once police agencies use technology that goes beyond what can
be observed with the naked eye, the Court has been less willing to
allow warrantless operation. One example of such technology is
thermal cameras, which can be operated from a public road yet see
through walls and other obstructions to give a rough image of
activities inside a home or other building. 60 In Kyllo, law
enforcement used a thermal camera from a public street to look into
a suspected grow house to determine whether lamps for growing
marijuana were inside.61 The Court held that the occupants had been
subjected to a “search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as

55

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–214 (1986).
Id. at 214.
57
Florida. v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
58
Id. at 450.
59
Id.
60
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
61
Id.
56
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they satisfied both the subjective understanding and reasonable
expectation prongs of the Katz test.62
The Kyllo Court made a particularly valuable observation that
will likely prove useful in evaluating future technologies. The
opinion notes the expansion of technology has “uncovered portions
of the house and its curtilage that once were private.”63 The novel
use of thermal cameras led the Court to hold that law enforcement
usage “constitute[d] a search – at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.”64 Therefore,
similar to airplanes in Ciraolo and helicopters in Riley, Kyllo
suggests “mainstream adoption of technology” and a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” exist on a sliding scale. While technological
extensions of the “naked eye” are infringing at this point in time,
they may be considered reasonable in the future depending on
increased use, especially among consumers.
Finally, technologies enabling law enforcement to “track”
individuals have received a more adamant rejection from the
Supreme Court in the absence of a search warrant. Placing a tracking
device on an individual’s private property is a clear violation of the
right to privacy as established under original Fourth Amendment
prohibitions on physical intrusion.65 In Jones, the Court held that
law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when officers
“installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep
while it was parked in a public parking lot.”66 Despite the Jeep being
a vehicle, the Court extended physical property protections
equivalent to those of a private home, rendering a Katz analysis
unnecessary. Though the Katz test may have expanded the Court’s
interpretation of a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” physical
intrusions remain unconstitutional. 67 Thus, infringing on private
property through the use of physical equipment establishes a strong
upper bound on the capacity of law enforcement to gather
information without obtaining a search warrant.

62

Id. at 34.
Id.
64
Id.
65
E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
66
Id. at 403.
67
Id. at 407.
63
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3. Why Neighborhood Watch Programs in the IoT Era?
Beyond the economic and social considerations encouraging the
development of neighborhood watch programs, the Fourth
Amendment framework articulated by the Supreme Court to
establish the “reasonable expectation of privacy” provides legal and
operational incentives for law enforcement to enlist the help of
private citizens. First, citizens provide additional sets of eyes on
public thoroughfares, which have been repeatedly reaffirmed as
public information under the Fourth Amendment. 68 Second,
information gathered by third parties under such circumstances may
be used in an investigation without implicating the Fourth
Amendment rights of the subject individual.69 Finally, information
collected by the public serves as a useful barometer under the
Court’s reservation in Kyllo to demonstrate that a technology has
reached the status of “general public use,” and thus a corresponding
expectation of privacy by an individual is no longer “reasonable.”70
Therefore, financial, social and legal factors may not only drive
existing neighborhood watch programs forward, but could make
them stronger than ever with the proper mix of policy changes.
B.Modern Neighborhood Watch Programs
1. Security Camera Registries
In addition to the traditional housing community-based
neighborhood watch programs, local security camera registries are
another fast-growing tool of civic activists who are concerned with
crime in their community. 71 These types of neighborhood watch
programs can take two primary forms: (1) businesses provide police
with their addresses so they can be contacted for a copy of security
video if there is an incident within the vicinity of their locations, and
68

E.g., Id. at 412.
E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441 (1976).
70
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (2001).
71
See, e.g., PPB joins surveillance camera registry program, KOIN (Apr. 27,
2017),
http://koin.com/2017/04/27/ppb-joins-surveillance-camera-registryprogram/.
69
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(2) direct connection of security cameras into a centralized city
database. 72 While one might expect the public to be hesitant to
accept a system of constant monitoring from a centralized location,
public surveys appear to indicate the opposite: “86% of adults
expect private business surveillance video to help law enforcement
identify suspects and solve crimes.”73 Perhaps more surprisingly,
over 50% of those surveyed indicated businesses have an
affirmative duty to ensure their systems are capable of contributing
to police efforts. 74 By doing so, the overall utility of the system
increases as more public spaces are recorded. Thus, the
effectiveness and low overall social cost of instituting a security
camera registry suggests this could be an increasingly useful
investigative resource as we enter the IoT era.
2. Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA)
While fliers and community meetings have traditionally
informed the public of threats facing their safety, the exponential
rise of cellphones offer a unique tool for authorities who are
responsible for keeping those communities safe. The Warning,
Alert, and Response Network (WARN) Act of 2006 created a new,
voluntary nationwide alert system for communicating with the
public during emergency situations.75 Key provisions of the law set
requirements for who may send a message; a qualifying event
requires an “imminent threat to the public health or safety.” 76
Additionally, the statute recognizes the need to remain current with
advancements in technology, charging the National Alert Office
with publishing a plan every five years outlining “future capabilities
and communications platforms for the [system].”77 A National Alert
System working group comprised of subject area experts also
72

See, e.g., Kevin Dolak, Private Surveillance Cameras Catching More
Criminals, ABC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/privatesurveillance-cameras-catching-criminals/story?id=18315023.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, Pub. L. No. 109–347 (2006).
76
Id.
77
Id.
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regularly meets to make new recommendations based on
advancements in technology.78
While the WARN Act represents a step in the right direction
toward improving public safety, a decade later, the system is under
widespread criticism for the slow pace of modernization.79 After the
September 2016 New York and New Jersey bombings, Senator
Charles Schumer cited the Wireless Emergency Alert system’s lack
of ability to send a photo of the suspect as a crucial shortcoming.80
In the same week, emergency management officials from four major
cities, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
the National Weather Service each urged the Federal
Communications Commission to speed approval of a more
advanced system.81 While the FCC did approve the implementation
of phone number and URL linking in WEA messages by 2019, there
is still a long way to go before realizing the full potential of IoT to
aid public safety.82 Abilities such as text, photo, or video replies are
notable omissions that will be key to IoT’s societal contribution.
Thus, while means already exist to communicate with the public on
safety issues, additional work is necessary before law enforcement
can leverage the information sharing capabilities of modern IoT
devices.
3. AMBER Alerts
While the WEA system was primarily created to inform the
public of threats, the America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency
Response (AMBER) Alert system directly enlists the public’s help
78
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in locating abducted children. Since the system’s creation in 1996,
over 800 children have been rescued specifically because of
AMBER Alerts.83 In addition to a message being sent out using the
WEA system, warnings “are broadcast on radio and television and
[Department of Transportation] highway signs.” 84 Broadcast
warnings and highways signs are utilized based on the suspected
locality of the child, and phones of local citizens are targeted
through the WEA system based on their GPS location.”85 Though
public safety officials seek to create awareness and participation
through AMBER Alert communication, users are still limited in the
ways they can respond as a message recipient. 86 While links to
phone numbers and picture URLs will improve the system, there is
still no planned means of reply other than via phone call.87 The lack
of a digital two-way communications system in response to public
alerts raises an important question: how much safer and more
effective could public safety efforts become if individuals could
respond to a crisis with not only what they see, but also the data
captured by their IoT devices?
III.

FUTURE SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that the hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations. But technology can change those expectations.
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which
popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce
significant changes in popular attitudes . . . . In circumstances
involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to
privacy concerns may be legislative . . . A legislative body is
83

See AMBER Alert, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://www.amberalert.gov/faqs.htm.
84
Id.
85
Brad Knickerbocker, Amber Alerts THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0811/Amber-AlertsHow-successful-have-they-been-in-saving-abducted-kids.
86
See, e.g., AMBER Alert, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017),
http://www.amberalert.gov (explaining the Sept. 29, 2016 FCC policy updates
and contact information for NCMEC).
87
Id.

18 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 13:1

well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed
lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way.88
While the WEA system and AMBER Alerts have already
improved public safety for many years, recent events like the 2016
New York and New Jersey bombings underscore the need for further
collaboration between law enforcement/watch programs and
modern technologies. While a photo or longer message would serve
as a step in the right direction, technology can be more extensively
utilized under current Supreme Court privacy interpretations to
bolster public safety through improved data sharing. In a short
number of years, drones and self-driving cars are expected to
revolutionize a number of fields, including transportation, delivery,
and mapping. Some of these new IoT technologies are expected to
capture information at one gigabyte per second, potentially adding
up to two petabytes per year with a single device.89 For context, that
is twice the amount of all of the data stored in all of the academic
research libraries in the United States.90
With each citizen and business soon collecting seemingly
unimaginable amounts of data about the world, there is great
potential for communities and government to work together to
determine ways for this information to be used for the public good.
Despite the passage of hundreds of years of technical advancement
since the creation of neighborhood watch programs, relatively little
has changed in how information is shared between neighbors and
public officers. While in-person interaction between neighbors
characterized the first iterations of neighborhood watch programs,
soon the technological pieces will be in place for neighborhood
watch 2.0.
88
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A.Data Sources of Tomorrow
“[Driverless] cars are going to be out there looking . . .
[w]e’ll have to put limitations on it. We’ll have to encrypt
that data and make sure I can’t tell that it’s John’s [car]
necessarily . . . but the amount of social good that can
come from that far outweighs those concerns.” – Brian
Krzanich, Chief Executive Officer, Intel, Inc.91
1. Corporations/Businesses
As existing security camera registries demonstrate, there is
tremendous potential for solving crimes and public safety challenges
by creating a mesh network of privately-owned resources.
Additionally, technology systems owned by businesses generally
have more advanced features and utilize industry standards for
interoperability, which are lacking in many consumer products. The
growth of IoT gives law enforcement the opportunity to redouble
their efforts to collaborate with local businesses and benefit from
more investigative data from fewer sources.
a. Principle Benefit – Data Aggregation
Businesses regularly organize the information they collect to
improve manageability, creating an opportunity for law enforcement
to leverage this accessibility when conducting an investigation. As
previously mentioned with the deployment of body cameras,
extracting relevant and actionable information has added substantial
complexity and cost to the rollout of this new technology.
Municipalities are already experiencing benefits as a result of
working with private entities to leverage their collected data. The
Alphabet-owned mapping and traffic app Waze is quickly becoming
an invaluable tool in transportation planning, with over 72 United
91
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States municipalities already benefitting from their “Connected
Citizens Program” data base. 92 Waze crowdsources user data
through its smartphone app about real-time road conditions, such as
potholes, slow traffic, and flooding.93 Crowdsourcing is defined as
“the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by
soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially
from the online community.” 94 Not only is this information
collected without cost to the city, but Waze has even worked to
integrate its data with at least one company that develops mapping
software commonly used by transportation departments.95 Thus, not
only are public agencies benefitting from cost savings by having to
maintain less infrastructure to accomplish the same tasks, but the
data is even already organized and ready for use.
Business suppliers are already envisioning the deployment of
data aggregation software with camera systems. In June 2015, Ford
applied for a patent on a system that crowdsources license plate
images from back-up cameras.96 Ford claims it will initially only be
used in commercial fleets. 97 However, with back-up cameras
already a common feature in personal vehicles, this program may be
subject to expansion with minimal technical difficulty in the
future.98 By adopting improved communications technologies, law
enforcement agencies could request information and benefit from
advancements already present in private industry.
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b. Legal Limits of Data Aggregation
While receiving the data collected by corporations appears to be
an attractive proposition from a cost perspective, there are several
legal issues that should be taken into account before starting to make
bulk requests for company information. While information may be
collected from public thoroughfares, that does not always mean such
data is lawful. For example, the interception of Wi-Fi
communications collected by a vehicle driving through a
neighborhood was found to be unlawful.99 Additionally, companies’
ability to access system-wide data and pinpoint individuals, viewing
their location and personally identifying information, has come
under scrutiny.100 Ride-hailing app Uber was fined $20,000 by the
New York Attorney General’s office after an investigation found
excessive internal access to sensitive customer information.101 Both
law enforcement agencies and companies must carefully craft
agreements that respect the privacy of customers, while
distinguishing types of data in which a company has more extensive
rights of use for public benefit.
2. Private Citizens as Data Sources
Communities have been slower to adopt technologies that allow
them to share data for mutual benefit. However, there is tremendous
potential for a new era of safe neighborhoods with crowdsourced
data and well-discussed policies at its core. With its reliance on open
standards and integrations, IoT technologies will drive a new level
of interoperability, similar to that which is already seen in
collaboration between police and the business community.
Despite these new potential sources of data, a key challenge will
be the communication and notification infrastructure that enables
sharing both within neighborhoods and between neighborhoods and
law enforcement. While the WEA system is one promising
99
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candidate, the FCC’s slow development of even one-way photo
messaging indicates that a federal system remains a distant
possibility. Fortunately, the public has already demonstrated a
willingness to adopt smartphone apps to engage with those around
them. Nextdoor is one such neighborhood network app, which as of
2015, had over 77,000 communities signed up for the service.102
Unlike Facebook or other traditional social media tools, Nextdoor
connects users solely with people in their geographic area.103 The
app has already found a number of uses including wild animal alerts,
crime reporting, searching for missing animals, and notification
preferences that can send special alerts in case of emergency.104
While Nextdoor is not the only application with these features,
it serves as a useful starting point to consider the future role IoT
could play in making communities safer. Ultimately the success of
any neighborhood data sharing program will depend on the views
and attributes of that particular community. By starting a discussion
now, cities can begin to determine: (1) whether the public is
interested in such a program, and (2) a desirable operations model
for the development of such a program. Like the Waze Connected
Citizens Program, public-private partnerships could be developed to
help municipalities start similar programs at little to no cost, once
appropriate ordinances are in place. Alternatively, a city desiring
tighter control over the sharing of citizen data could work with the
National Alert Office to create enhanced capabilities in their region,
or invest in necessary communications infrastructure themselves.
From a budgetary perspective, citizens will purchase their own IoT
hardware for personal use, meaning the costly task of deploying this
equipment will already be complete. With proper leadership,
communities will have the opportunity to experience substantial
gains in public safety at low cost, with only minimal impact on
overall privacy.
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a. Principle Benefits – Community Engagement and Establishing
“Reasonability”
With a voluntary data crowdsourcing strategy, many of the
problems that have plagued direct collection of data can be avoided
while citizens serve as a check on the invasiveness of law
enforcement in their community. As previously discussed with the
rollout of body cameras, one of the major costs and logistical
challenges has been sorting through footage and determining what
is important. Additionally, the lack of previously considered policies
creates substantial concerns over the actual processing of the data,
how long it is stored, and whether it was correctly obtained. By
relying on community members to voluntarily contribute
information from narrow temporal or geographic windows, the
public will have greater confidence that information being collected
by law enforcement has a strong connection to public safety
concerns in their area. From a community engagement perspective,
the opportunity to contribute IoT data for the good of the public
represents a low-cost, low-effort way to improve the safety of the
local neighborhood.
Beyond policy and social benefits, there are compelling legal
reasons to employ a voluntary data crowdsourcing system. Since
relevant IoT devices would be collecting information from public
areas, this data source represents a category of information
repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court as explicitly not
protected under the Fourth Amendment.105 Even more useful from
the perspective of law enforcement is the fact that such data
collection will signify mainstream consumer adoption; the Kyllo
court hinted this may be enough to overcome a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that does not take into account the
advancements of modern technology.106 For example, driving video
has traditionally required individuals to purchase a separate dash
camera that must be individually operated. But now, automakers are
moving towards direct access of video captured by built-in cameras
used for safety and semi-autonomous systems. 107 The capture of
105
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driving video by increasingly mainstream, integrated vehicle
systems provides one example of a societal shift that is likely to alter
the reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, encouraging a
crowdsourced data model while limiting law enforcement adoption
of more advanced tools will keep the public informed on the state of
their privacy rights and minimize the likelihood of intrusive, bulk
collection of data directly by law enforcement.
b. Limits of a Citizen Data Crowdsourcing Strategy
As with most types of municipal technology adoption,
implementation will be key to maximizing the positive effects of a
crowdsourcing strategy. First, frequently contacting citizens about
crimes could risk an increase in apathy if cooperation is overly
burdensome or taken advantage of by law enforcement in a way that
hurts individuals. As the WARN Act and the AMBER Alert
program each demonstrate, there is already an effort to minimize
notification to only the most serious situations to prevent disinterest
or annoyance. Any system that a local government considers should
be operated to minimize the likelihood of such a community
response.
Second, the slower pace of policymaking relative to the
consumer product market means careful consideration should be
given not only to current IoT products, but also to those that are yet
to be developed. Only the public should have the option to
contribute information gathered from a new device if it is not used
where someone would have both a subjective and reasonable
expectation of privacy. Changes to the scope or operations of the
program should come only after a dialogue with the public to ensure
continued community support for such efforts.
Finally, while current Supreme Court interpretations of
individual privacy rights allow for the creation of this system, largescale efforts to collect and aggregate private data could be
implemented in a way deemed too invasive. Similar to the concern
of FBI legal counsel over the aggregation of license plates,108 the
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collection of citizen-sourced data, even if lawful, could be mistaken
for government intrusion, unless the system is tactfully
implemented. Though it does not directly contradict the Court’s
opinion on tracking in Jones,109 this new investigative tool may be
viewed as an alternate means of accomplishing the same invasive
end.
CONCLUSION
The growth of the Internet of Things offers new opportunities
for the average citizen to contribute data collected by their devices
to enhance public safety in their communities. While the Court has
not directly ruled on the legality of such a system, the framework
articulated by the Court for interpreting modern privacy rights under
the Fourth Amendment suggests the law will not interfere with such
a system if properly implemented. An early public dialogue and
policy drafting process will be crucial no matter how extensively
local governments wish to use data from IoT devices for public
purposes. In the meantime, the public should encourage both the
National Alert System working group and National Alert Office to
further develop the WEA system as soon as possible, not only to
allow communication of more expansive content to the public, but
also to create the capacity to receive information and route it to the
appropriate bodies. While it will ultimately be up to each
community to determine how they wish to use their personal data,
the Internet of Things represents an opportunity to make
neighborhood watch more vigilant than ever before.
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PRACTICE POINTERS
▪ Public willingness to contribute information depends on
establishing thorough and thoughtful policies surrounding
aggregation, use, storage, and deletion of data. Existing body
camera policies in many cities will provide a good starting
point for determining how citizen IoT data should be
handled in the future.
▪ The sourcing of citizen-collected data will likely be useful in
establishing the “objective reasonableness” prong of the
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. The Court
previously recognized “reasonableness” changes over time
with developments in society and technology. If private
citizens purchase IoT devices capable of interfacing with law
enforcement systems on a large scale, this offers a built-in
measure of community expectations and shift in what is
“reasonable.”

